Let me say this clearly before anyone panics. England are not suddenly a bad team. They had one frustrating night against a side that arrived in Boston with a single, very clear plan, and they could not find the key to unlock it. That is a completely different problem from being poor, and it is a far easier one to fix.

The numbers tell you how one-sided the evening was in everything except the part that decides games. England had nearly 79 per cent of the ball, the most possession any team has ever recorded at a World Cup without scoring. It was also the first match of this tournament to produce no shot on target in the opening 45 minutes from either side. Six days after putting four past Croatia, England's first real sight of goal was a tame Anthony Gordon effort, with a late Harry Kane chance the closest they came to winning it.

This is becoming a familiar pattern, because England have now been held up in their second group game at four straight tournaments. The point all but secures qualification and they are still on course to win Group L with Panama to come, so there is no need for alarm. But there were genuine tactical problems on show, and they are worth breaking down properly, not least because they also explain why Thomas Tuchel spent a good portion of the night shouting at Djed Spence.

England (4-3-3): Pickford; James, Konsa, Guéhi, Spence; Anderson, Rice, Bellingham; Madueke, Kane, Gordon

Ghana (4-5-1 out of possession): a deep, disciplined block led by Jordan Ayew, with Benjamin Asare in goal.

Tuchel made two changes from the side that beat Croatia, with Marc Guéhi coming in for John Stones and Djed Spence replacing Nico O'Reilly.

Before we get to England, the credit Ghana deserve. Their plan was simple, it was clear, and they executed it for ninety minutes.

It was pointed out at half time that Ghana had set up around 12 metres deeper than England seemed to expect, and that one detail shaped everything that followed. They held a disciplined 4-5-1 throughout, and the block was built around three specific jobs done well. One player consistently occupied the space around Rice and Bellingham in the half spaces, a second cut the passing lane into Kane so that England's centre forward could not receive between the lines, and the line itself sat deep enough to remove the single weapon that had hurt Croatia.

That last part is the one that mattered most. Against Croatia, England's threat over the top was lethal. Against Ghana it was switched off completely, because a back line that starts deep has far less space to protect in behind, and a defender who is already dropping finds it much easier to deal with a run from deep than one who is caught stepping up. Ghana stood off, looked after the space behind them, and invited England to play through the front of the block rather than around the back of it.

[Ghana's deep 4-5-1, a man on Rice and Bellingham in the half spaces, the lane into Kane cut]

Here is where England made Ghana's job easier than it needed to be.

Facing a side sitting that deep with no intention of pressing, England still committed four players to their own back line for long stretches, and that is simply too many bodies behind the ball in a game with no immediate threat to defend against. When the opposition striker is isolated and the block is camped on the edge of its own area, you do not need a full back four sitting deep. You need those numbers higher up the pitch, adding bodies around the block and overloading it.

The full backs were central to this. Rather than holding their width and depth, at least one of them needed to step inside and higher, both to add a man in the middle and to stop Ghana locking on so comfortably every time the ball was worked wide. By staying wide and deep, England allowed Ghana to shuffle across and spring the touchline trap without ever being stretched or asked a difficult question.

[England's passive back four against a camped block, full-back staying wide rather than inverting]

A passive shape tends to produce passive passing, and that is exactly what happened.

Time and again the ball arrived at Spence with Elliot Anderson available in front of him, and the pass that should have been driven into Anderson's back foot to let him turn and play forward either came too slowly or did not come at all. Anderson is one of England's best ball winners and progressors, and his frustration at not receiving in those positions was written all over him. England did not use him anywhere near enough in the areas where he is most dangerous. The ball needs to find him on the half turn, facing forward, with the kind of pace on the pass that lets him attack the space in front rather than check back and recycle.

[Spence on the ball with Anderson open on the back foot, the forward pass that never arrived]

England's clearest route to hurting a deep block is width and quick ball circulation, and there were flashes of it down the right through the connection between Reece James and Noni Madueke. The problem was timing.

Ghana got across to press the winger tight every single time the ball went wide, which meant Madueke needed a first-time option the instant he received it. He rarely had one. For that pattern to work, James has to make his overlapping run earlier, before the ball even arrives, so that the moment Madueke is closed down he already has somewhere to go and the covering centre back is dragged across to deal with it. Instead the run kept coming late, the support arrived after the pressure rather than before it, and the move died on the touchline.

[the James and Madueke right side, Ghana sliding across tight, the overlap arriving too late]

If the big diagonal switch is too difficult to land cleanly, and against a compact block it usually is, there is a simpler answer that England kept declining all night. Move the ball along the floor instead of lofting it through the air.

A crisp ground pass that misses out the nearest centre back and finds the far side with real speed does two valuable things at once. It moves the point of attack faster than the defence can shift across to meet it, and it arrives at a player who can take it cleanly and play first time, which a dropping ball from the air into a congested middle never allows. England left their most natural ranged passers out of this squad, so the job falls to quick, brave circulation on the ground instead, and far too often they reached for the safe sideways pass rather than the one that actually breaks a line.

[the ground switch, skipping the near centre back to release the far side quickly]

All of this comes together in the moment that explains Tuchel's frustration on the touchline.

Spence was not positive enough, and the same picture kept repeating. England carried far more cover at the back than the situation ever required, and Spence sat in rather than pushing on. The instruction being yelled at him was a simple one. With that much protection behind him, he needed to get up the pitch, support his winger, and give Ghana a problem to solve in wide areas. A full back who joins the attack turns a 1v1 on the wing into a 2v1 and forces the block into a decision it would much rather avoid. By staying home, Spence let Ghana defend the flank in comfort, and Tuchel saw a player being cautious in a game that was crying out for the opposite.

[Spence's conservative position with cover behind him and space ahead to attack]

England were not bad. They were safe, and against a team that came purely to frustrate, safe was never going to be enough. Every issue on the night traces back to the same root. A passive structure put too many players behind the ball, which fed passive passing, slow wide play, and full backs who stayed at home when the game was begging them to be brave. None of that is a talent problem. All of it is a tweak.

There is also a strong case that England needed a night exactly like this one. They will run into more low blocks as the tournament goes on, especially in the knockout rounds, and it is far better to meet the problem now, with qualification all but secured and Panama still to play, than to discover it in a game they cannot afford to draw. Tuchel put it well afterwards when he said his side needed to be patient but brave at the right moments. That is the entire lesson in a single sentence. The patience was there all night. The bravery was missing.

They will fix this. A few adjustments, more numbers around the block, quicker ball speed, full backs pushing on, and the same side that swept Croatia aside will look a lot more like themselves. This was a bad night, not a bad team.

One game. One breakdown. Every week.

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The Tactics Academy Newsletter | Issue #007 Lucas | Coach, Analyst, Founder