If you watch football and find yourself asking why: why that shape, why that press, why that decision cost them the game…this newsletter is for you.

Every week, I pick one game and take it apart. Not the highlights, but the tactical detail underneath it. The structures, the decisions and the moments that most people miss.

My name is Lucas. I’m a football coach working toward my UEFA B licence and I run The Tactics Academy - an education brand built on one belief: that understanding the game deeply makes you better at it, whether you’re a coach, a player, or just someone who loves football more than is probably healthy.

This isn’t punditry. There are no hot takes here. What you’ll get every week is one game, with key insights picked out, with an honest eye on what worked, what didn’t and what the tactical picture actually looked like beneath the surface.

One game. One breakdown. Every week.

Let’s get into it.

A Wembley cup final between two sides with very different recent histories in this competition.

Arsenal (4-2-3-1): Kepa; White, Saliba, Gabriel, Hincapié; Zubimendi, Rice; Saka, Havertz, Trossard; Gyökeres

Manchester City (4-2-3-1): Trafford; O’Reilly, Aké, Silva, Khusanov; Rodri, Bernardo Silva; Nunes, Cherki, Doku; Haaland

To understand what City did, you first need to understand what Arsenal are trying to do when they build from the back.

A massive part of Arsenal’s game is in the build-up phase and they get a lot of joy against most opponents through a specific mechanism. They bait the opposition’s midfield into stepping high, then rotate player positions to make marking tasks more difficult. The result is a spare player appearing in the separation space (the zone between the opposition’s first and second line) who can receive on the half-turn and immediately drive forward.

This typically allows Arsenal to bypass the opposition’s first line cleanly, progress into midfield through carrying and then create matched-up or overloaded situations against a deeper defensive block. It’s a sophisticated, well-drilled system that causes most teams serious problems.

Against City in this final, it produced nothing.

When Kepa had the ball at his feet, City set up in what looked like a high press - a flat line of four high up the pitch, with Rodri and Bernardo Silva sitting as a midfield two behind them.

But here’s what made it unusual: it was passive.

Typically, if you commit a high line of four that far up the pitch, you press aggressively. You lock on quickly, you try to win the ball high, and you accept the risk of being played through. City did none of that.

Their first line of four maintained horizontal distances of no more than 10 yards between each player. A tight, disciplined unit. The two strikers had one job: cover-shadow any pass into Arsenal’s number six, staying tight enough to make that central option unavailable. The two wide players managed their distances carefully, ready to jump and lock on the moment the ball went wide to an Arsenal full-back.

On paper, City were in a 4-2-4. In practice, they were operating in a 6-0-4.

Behind that high line, Rodri and Bernardo Silva did something most teams would never attempt… they dropped deeper, back towards City’s own defensive line, deliberately leaving Arsenal players like Saka and Rice free in the progression zone.

This looks like an enormous gift. Arsenal had players available between the lines with space to receive and turn. But City weren’t worried, because those players were exactly where City wanted them.

Here’s why. City are acutely aware of two things: Arsenal’s threat from long balls into their forward line and their own historical vulnerability when matched up against an opposition attack in behind. Guardiola didn’t ignore that weakness - he built the entire press around protecting against it.

Rodri and Silva acted as ‘shuttlers’. Their positioning ensured City had numerical superiority against Arsenal’s front line at all times and when any second ball dropped in the centre of the park from a long pass, they were perfectly placed to pounce. Compact distances as a unit meant they could react quickly in either direction, step to press or drop to defend.

Now here’s the detail that made the whole thing work.

Every time Kepa had the ball, City’s first line sat approximately 20 yards away from him.

That distance is the key to everything.

If Arsenal tried to play a penetrative pass through City’s first line into the free players in the separation space, the pass had to travel far enough and slowly enough for City’s line to read, react and intercept. At 10 yards, the ball speed would carry it through before City could respond. At 20 yards, they had time.

And if Kepa tried to play over the top of them into that space? The ball would be in the air, slower, harder to control and arriving in a central area where the receiving player has no idea what’s pressing from behind. Rodri and Silva could step up to contest it comfortably.

City gave Kepa two options. Go long and play into their numerical trap. Or go wide to the full-back and trigger the lock-on, where City’s defensive midfield would step sharply to neutralise Arsenal’s rotational threat before it could develop.

Arsenal’s build-up (one of the most sophisticated in European football) was rendered completely ineffective.

The rotational movements that pull opposition midfielders out of position never got started, because City’s midfield never engaged high enough to be pulled. The penetrative passes through the lines were blocked by disciplined cover-shadows. The long ball option played straight into City’s overloaded back line.

Kepa was left with no good answer.

This was Guardiola at his most precise, not pressing aggressively for the sake of it, but building a structure so carefully calibrated that Arsenal’s greatest strength simply had nowhere to go. The passive high press wasn’t a compromise. It was the point.

We won’t see the last of this.

Every week, one game. One breakdown.

If you found this useful, share it with a coach or player who thinks about football the way you do. And if you want to go deeper on tactical analysis and development, The Tactics Academy has you covered (link in my profile).

The Tactics Academy | Issue #001

- Lucas

Coach | Analyst | Founder